HPE6-A78 Sample Questions Answers

If clients cannot authenticate and there is no record of the authentication attempt in Aruba ClearPass Access Tracker, two possible problems that could cause this symptom are:

• The RADIUS shared secret does not match between the switch and CPPM. This mismatch would prevent the switch and CPPM from successfully communicating, so authentication attempts would fail, and no record would appear in Access Tracker.
• CPPM does not have a network device profile defined for the switch's IP address. Without a network device profile, CPPM would not recognize authentication attempts coming from the switch and would not process them, resulting in no logs in Access Tracker.

The other options are incorrect because:

• Users logging in with the wrong credentials would still generate an attempt record in Access Tracker.
• Clients configured to use a mismatched EAP method would also generate an attempt record in Access Tracker.
• Clients not configured to trust the root CA certificate for CPPM's RADIUS/EAP certificate might fail authentication, but the attempt would still be logged in Access Tracker.

To maintain a digital chain of custody in a network, a crucial practice is to ensure that all network infrastructure devices receive a valid clock using authenticated Network Time Protocol (NTP). Accurate and synchronized time stamps are essential for creating reliable and legally defensible logs. Authenticated NTP ensures that the time being set on devices is accurate and that the time source is verified, which is necessary for correlating logs from different devices and for forensic analysis.

References:

• Digital forensics and network security protocols that underscore the importance of accurate timekeeping for maintaining a digital chain of custody.
• NTP configuration guidelines for network devices, emphasizing the use of authentication to prevent tampering with clock settings.

Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE) provides encrypted communications on open Wi-Fi networks, which addresses the company's desire to have encryption without requiring a password for guests. It can work in transition mode, which allows for the use of OWE by clients that support it, while still permitting legacy clients to connect without encryption. Combining this with a captive portal enables the desired welcome web page for guests to log in.

ArubaOS-Switches can use sFlow technology to sample network traffic and send the samples to a collector, such as ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM), for analysis. sFlow can be configured to capture various types of traffic, including HTTP, which typically contains User-Agent strings that can be used for device fingerprinting and classification.

To support the requirement for using HTTP User-Agent strings to classify endpoints, the switches would need to be configured to send sFlow samples containing HTTP traffic to CPPM. CPPM would then analyze these samples and use the User-Agent strings to classify the devices.

Therefore, the correct action to configure ArubaOS-Switches would involve:

• Configuring CPPM as the sFlow collector on the switches.
• Enabling sFlow on the edge ports that connect to endpoints.

This approach allows the network traffic to be analyzed by CPPM without requiring any additional mirroring or redirection of traffic, which would be resource-intensive and potentially disruptive to network performance.

When an ArubaOS solution detects a rogue AP with Wireless Intrusion Prevention (WIP), the most crucial information that can help locate the rogue device is the detecting devices. This is because the detecting devices can provide the physical location or the network topology context where the rogue AP has been detected1.

The detecting devices are typically the Air Monitors (AMs) or Access Points (APs) in the network that have identified the rogue AP’s presence. These devices can provide information such as the signal strength and the direction from which the rogue AP’s signals are being received. By triangulating this information from multiple detecting devices, it becomes possible to pinpoint the physical location of the rogue AP2.

Additionally, the detecting devices can log events and alerts that can be reviewed to understand the rogue AP’s behavior, such as the channels it is operating on and the potential impact on the authorized wireless network1. This information is vital for network administrators to quickly and effectively respond to the threat posed by the rogue AP.

In contrast, the match method (A) and match type © relate to how the rogue AP is classified and identified by the system, which is useful for classification but not for physical location. The confidence level (D) indicates the system’s certainty in the classification but does not aid in locating the device2.

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) relies on a trusted root Certification Authority (CA) to issue certificates. Devices and users must trust the root CA for the PKI to be effective. If a root CA certificate is not pre-installed or manually chosen to be trusted on a device, any certificates issued by that CA will not be inherently trusted by the device.

For following Aruba best security practices, the setting you should change is to disable local authentication. When integrating with an external RADIUS server like ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) for authenticating administrative access to the Mobility Controller (MC), it is a best practice to rely on the external server rather than the local user database. This practice not only centralizes the management of user roles and access but also enhances security by leveraging CPPM's advanced authentication mechanisms.

References:

• Aruba Networks official best practice documentation, which recommends centralized authentication for administrative access.
• Security standards and guidelines that promote the use of external RADIUS servers for authentication purposes.

Based on the exhibit showing the firewall rules, the following traffic is permitted:

• Client 1 is allowed to send HTTPS traffic to any destination within the subnet 10.1.10.0/24 because there is a permit rule for the user to access svc-https to that subnet.
• Responses to initiated connections are typically allowed by stateful firewalls; hence, an HTTPS response from 10.1.10.10 to client 1 is expected to be permitted even though it is not explicitly mentioned in the firewall rules (assuming the stateful nature of the firewall).

The vulnerability of an unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman exchange, particularly when it comes to the risk of a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack, is a significant concern. In this scenario, a hacker can intercept the public values exchanged between two legitimate parties and substitute them with their own. This allows the attacker to decrypt or manipulate the messages passing between the two original parties without them knowing. This answer is based on the fundamental principles of how Diffie-Hellman key exchange works and its vulnerabilities without authentication mechanisms. Reference materials from cryptographic textbooks and security protocols detail these vulnerabilities, such as those found in standards and publications by organizations like NIST.QUESTION NO: 2

What is a difference between radius and TACACS+?

A. RADIUS combines the authentication and authorization process while TACACS+ separates them.

B. RADIUS uses TCP for Its connection protocol, while TACACS+ uses UDP tor its connection protocol.

C. RADIUS encrypts the complete packet, white TACACS+ only offers partial encryption.

D. RADIUS uses Attribute Value Pairs (AVPs) in its messages, while TACACS+ does not use them.

Answer: A

RADIUS and TACACS+ are both protocols used for networking authentication, but they handle the processes of authentication and authorization differently. RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service) combines authentication and authorization into a single process, whereas TACACS+ (Terminal Access Controller Access-Control System Plus) separates these processes. This separation in TACACS+ allows more flexible policy enforcement and better control over commands a user can execute. This difference is well-documented in various network security resources, including Cisco's technical documentation and security protocol manuals.

In the context of an Aruba Mobility Controller (MC) configuration, a client will receive the default role assignment if they have passed 802.1X authentication and the authentication server did not send an Aruba-User-Role Vendor Specific Attribute (VSA). The default role is assigned by the MC when a client successfully authenticates but the authentication server provides no specific role instruction. This behavior ensures that a client is not left without any role assignment, which could potentially lead to a lack of network access or access control. This default role assignment mechanism is part of Aruba's role-based access control, as documented in the ArubaOS user guide and best practices.

When configuring ArubaOS-CX switches to tunnel client traffic to an Aruba Mobility Controller (MC), securing the control channel communications is crucial to prevent unauthorized access and ensure data integrity. Option B is the correct answer as it involves configuring a long, random PAPI security key that matches on both the switches and the MC. The PAPI (Policy Access Point Interface) protocol is used for secure communication between Aruba devices, and employing a robust, randomized security key significantly enhances the security of the control channel. This setup prevents potential interception or manipulation of the control traffic between the devices.

References:

• ArubaOS-CX Security Configuration Guide
• Aruba Networks Official Documentation

An example of a social engineering attack is described in option A, where an email is used to impersonate a bank and deceive users into entering their bank login information on a counterfeit website. Social engineering attacks exploit human psychology rather than technical hacking techniques to gain access to systems, data, or personal information. These attacks often involve tricking people into breaking normal security procedures. The other options describe different types of technical attacks that do not primarily rely on manipulating individuals through deceptive personal interactions.

The ArubaOS firewall determines which rules to apply to a specific client's traffic based on the rules in policies associated with the client's user role. User roles are a fundamental part of ArubaOS and the firewall policies they encompass. These roles contain policies that dictate permissions and restrictions for network traffic. When a client authenticates, it is assigned a role, and the firewall enforces the rules defined within that role for the client's traffic.

References:

• ArubaOS firewall and user role configuration guides that explain the role-based access control and firewall policy enforcement.
• Industry best practices for network access control that advocate for role-based enforcement mechanisms.

The thumbprint (also known as a fingerprint) of a certificate or SSH key is a hash that uniquely represents the public key contained within. When you first connect to the switch with SSH from a management station, you should ensure that the thumbprint matches what you expect. This is a security measure to confirm the identity of the device you are connecting to and to ensure that a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack is not occurring. If the thumbprint matches the known good thumbprint of the switch, it is safe to proceed with the connection.

References:

• SSH and network security protocols that discuss the importance of verifying the identity of devices before initiating a secure connection.
• IT security guides that provide best practices for avoiding MITM attacks during SSH sessions.

When a browser, like Chrome, is validating a web server's certificate, it uses the public key in the certificate's signing authority to verify the certificate's digital signature. In the case of the exhibit, the browser would use the public key in the DigiCert SHA2 Secure Server CA certificate to check the signature of the Arubapedia web server's certificate. This process ensures that the certificate was indeed issued by the claimed Certificate Authority (CA) and has not been tampered with.

References:

• Browser security documentation and SSL/TLS standards that explain the certificate validation process.
• Cybersecurity educational resources that cover the principles of public key infrastructure (PKI) and certificate validation.

To prevent users from exploiting Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) on a network with ArubaOS-Switches, the correct approach would be to enable DHCP snooping globally and on VLAN 201 before enabling ARP protection, as stated in option C. DHCP snooping acts as a foundation by tracking and securing the association of IP addresses to MAC addresses. This allows ARP protection to function effectively by ensuring that only valid ARP requests and responses are processed, thus preventing ARP spoofing attacks. Trusting ports that connect to employee devices directly could lead to bypassing ARP protection if those devices are compromised.

The company’s goal is to prevent internal users from exploiting ARP within their ArubaOS-Switch network. Let’s break down the options:

• Option A (Incorrect): Enabling ARP protection globally on Switch-1 and all VLANs is not the best approach. ARP protection should be selectively applied where needed, not globally. It’s also not clear why Switch-1 is mentioned when the exhibit focuses on Switch-2.
• Option B (Incorrect): Making ports connected to employee devices trusted for ARP protection is a good practice, but it’s not sufficient by itself. Trusted ports allow ARP traffic, but we need an additional layer of security.
• Option C (Correct): This is the recommended approach. Here’s why:
• Option D (Incorrect): While static ARP bindings can enhance security, they are cumbersome to manage and don’t dynamically adapt to changes in the network.

References:

• ArubaOS-Switch Management and Configuration Guide for WB_16_10 - Chapter 15: IP Routing Features
• Aruba Security Guide

In the context of WPA3-Enterprise with EAP-TLS authentication, the error message "Client doesn’t support configured EAP methods" suggests that the client is not able to complete the EAP-TLS authentication process. EAP-TLS requires that both the server (in this case, CPPM) and the client have a valid certificate for mutual authentication. Windows 10 does support EAP-TLS natively, so options A, C, and D can be ruled out.

The most likely reason for the authentication failure is that the client device does not have the correct client certificate installed, which is required to establish a TLS session with the server. Therefore, ensuring that the client has a valid certificate installed that matches the server's requirements is the correct step to resolve this issue.

ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) can receive detailed information about client device type, OS, and status from ClearPass OnGuard. ClearPass OnGuard is part of the ClearPass suite and provides posture assessment and endpoint health checks. It gathers detailed information on the status and security posture of devices trying to connect to the network, such as whether antivirus software is up to date, which operating system is running, and other details that characterize the device's compliance with the network's security policies.

References:

• Aruba ClearPass product documentation that details the capabilities of ClearPass OnGuard.
• Network security resources that describe endpoint health checks and the importance of device posture assessment for access control.

Tarpit containment is a method used in ArubaOS Wireless Intrusion Prevention (WIP) to contain rogue APs. It differs from traditional wireless containment in several ways, particularly in how it interacts with clients and manages network resources.

Tarpit containment works by spoofing frames from an AP to confuse a client about its association. It forces the client to associate with a fake channel or BSSID, which is more efficient than rogue containment via repeated de-authorization requests. This method is designed to be less disruptive and more resource-efficient1.

Here’s why the other options are not correct:

• Option A is incorrect because tarpit containment does not involve sending ARP frames over the wired network. It operates wirelessly by creating a fake channel or BSSID.
• Option B is incorrect because tarpit containment does not selectively target authorized clients; it affects all clients connected to the rogue AP.
• Option C is incorrect because tarpit containment does require an RF Protect license to function2.

Therefore, Option D is the correct answer. Tarpit containment is more effective at keeping clients off the network with fewer disassociation frames than traditional wireless containment. It achieves this by forming associations with clients, which leads to a more efficient use of airtime and reduces the chance of negative effects on legitimate network users12.

Phishing is a type of social engineering attack where an attacker impersonates a trusted entity to deceive people into providing sensitive information, such as passwords or credit card numbers. An example of phishing is when an attacker sends emails posing as a service team member or a legitimate organization with the intention of getting users to disclose their passwords or other confidential information. These emails often contain links to fake websites that look remarkably similar to legitimate ones, tricking users into entering their details.References:

• Cybersecurity guidelines on identifying and preventing phishing attacks.

In managing ArubaOS-Switches, the best practice is to disable less secure protocols such as Telnet and use more secure alternatives like SSH (Secure Shell). SSH provides encrypted connections between network devices, which is critical for maintaining the security and integrity of network communications. This guideline is aligned with general security best practices that prioritize the use of protocols with strong, built-in encryption mechanisms to prevent unauthorized access and ensure data privacy.

For WPA3-Enterprise with EAP-TLS, it's crucial that clients have a trusted certificate installed for the authentication process. EAP-TLS relies on a mutual exchange of certificates for authentication. Deploying client certificates signed by a CA that CPPM trusts ensures that the ClearPass Policy Manager can verify the authenticity of the client certificates during the TLS handshake process. Trust in the root CA is typically required for the server side of the authentication process, not the client side, which is covered by the client’s own certificate.

In the context of ArubaOS Wireless Intrusion Prevention System (WIP), an authorized client is defined as a client that has successfully authenticated to an authorized Access Point (AP) and has passed encrypted traffic. This ensures that only clients which have been verified and authenticated according to the network's security policies are allowed to access network resources. Authentication typically involves credentials that are validated by a server, confirming the client's right to access the network securely.References:

• ArubaOS Wireless Intrusion Prevention System configuration and management guidelines.

WPA3-Enterprise enhances network security over WPA2-Enterprise through several improvements, one of which is the ability to operate in CNSA (Commercial National Security Algorithm) mode. This mode mandates the use of secure cryptographic algorithms during the 802.11 association process, ensuring that all communications are highly secure. The CNSA suite provides stronger encryption standards designed to protect sensitive government, military, and industrial communications. Unlike WPA2, WPA3's CNSA mode uses stronger cryptographic primitives, such as AES-256 in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for encryption and SHA-384 for hashing, which are not standard in WPA2-Enterprise.

In a wireless network deployment with Aruba Mobility Master (MM), Mobility Controllers (MCs), and Campus APs (CAPs), where a WLAN is configured to use Tunnel mode for forwarding, the user traffic is tunneled from the APs to the MCs. VLAN 301, which is assigned to the WLAN, must be present on the links from the MCs to the core routing switches because these switches act as the default router for the wireless user traffic. It is not necessary for the VLAN to be present on all campus LAN links or AP links, only between the MCs and the core routing switches where the routing for VLAN 301 will occur.

In the context of the ArubaOS Security Dashboard, if the goal is to find company clients that have connected to devices potentially operated by hackers, you would look for a client that is classified as 'Interfering' (indicating a security threat) while being connected to an 'AP Classification: Rogue'. A rogue AP is one that is not under the control of network administrators and is considered malicious or a security threat. Therefore, the client fitting this description is:

• MAC address: d8:50:e6:f3:70:ab; Client Classification: Interfering; AP Classification: Rogue

To ensure that only management stations in the subnet 192.168.1.0/24 can access the ArubaOS-Switches' Command Line Interface (CLI), Web UI, and REST interfaces, while also allowing managers to access other parts of the network, you should specify 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 as the authorized manager IP address on the switches. This configuration will restrict access to the switch management interfaces to devices within the specified IP address range, effectively creating a management access list.

References:

• ArubaOS-Switch management and configuration guide detailing IP authorized manager settings.
• Network management best practices which recommend controlling access to network devices' management interfaces.

The image indicates that there is an issue with the user role assignment, which is key to network access in ArubaOS. If the user role name sent by CPPM doesn't match any of the roles defined in the ArubaOS, then the user will be assigned a default or incorrect role that does not have the necessary permissions, thus leading to the connection errors and lack of Internet access. Ensuring that the role names are consistent between CPPM and ArubaOS can resolve this issue.