Identity-Security-Administrator Sample Questions Answers

This action is valid. In Identity Security Cloud, the health state of an individual Virtual Appliance is exposed through VA status and alert indicators. A VA displaying a Connected status is operating normally and maintaining communication with the SailPoint tenant. Therefore, when an administrator reviews the appliances in a VA cluster and encounters a VA whose status is Connected, no remediation is required for that particular appliance.

The administrator should continue reviewing the remaining VAs because cluster health depends on the operational state of all participating appliances. Other statuses can require intervention. For example, an inactive or disconnected appliance can indicate network, configuration, certificate, or service-related problems. Warning and error indicators should be investigated to determine whether restart, connectivity troubleshooting, configuration correction, or escalation is required.

Consequently, treating a Connected VA as healthy and proceeding to inspect the next appliance is the correct operational response.

Study Guide Reference: Virtual Appliances — Monitoring Virtual Appliance Health, VA Status and Alert Messages.

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The statement does not describe the purpose of a SailPoint Virtual Appliance. A VA is primarily a secure connectivity and connector-execution component . It allows an Identity Security Cloud tenant to communicate with enterprise sources and applications that require connectivity from within the customer's controlled environment.

SailPoint describes a VA as a Linux-based virtual machine that connects the tenant to applications and sources by using SailPoint APIs, connectors, and integrations. The VA continuously makes outbound calls to the SailPoint cloud for operations such as polling its cluster queue, performing data aggregation, executing provisioning operations, and receiving software updates.

The VA architecture does reduce the need to expose internal systems directly to inbound cloud connections, but that is fundamentally different from eliminating databases that contain PII. Enterprise applications, identity repositories, HR systems, directories, and other governed sources may continue to store personally identifiable information according to their own business and regulatory requirements.

Therefore, PII database elimination is neither the VA's purpose nor a consequence of deploying one.

Study Guide Reference: Virtual Appliances — VA Architecture, Secure Source Connectivity, Outbound Communication and Connector Execution.

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The statement is correct. A user does not need an administrative User Level such as Certification Admin or Org Admin merely to review a certification that has legitimately been assigned to them. Certification administration and certification reviewing are separate permission concepts.

The SailPoint User Level Access Matrix shows that the ordinary End User experience includes access to the Certifications functionality. This permits users to open certifications assigned to them, evaluate the relevant access items, record approval or revocation decisions, and sign off on the certification. Elevated Certification Admin permissions are instead required for administrative functions such as managing certification campaigns and broader certification configuration.

This design is essential because certification reviewers are commonly business managers, entitlement owners, source owners, Governance Group members, or other business stakeholders who should not require broad administrative privileges merely to participate in governance reviews.

Therefore, if a standard user has been properly assigned certification-review responsibility, ordinary user permissions are sufficient to perform that review.

Study Guide Reference: Platform — User Levels, End User Permissions, Certification Reviewers and Certification Administration.

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This statement is correct and closely matches SailPoint's official definition of a source. Identity Security Cloud does not treat an external enterprise system itself as being physically contained within the tenant. Instead, it creates a source definition representing that application, database, directory, HR system, or other managed environment.

The source definition supplies the governance context through which Identity Security Cloud interacts with the underlying system. A connector gathers account and access information and associates that data with the source. Identity Security Cloud can then correlate source accounts to identities, aggregate entitlements, model access, perform certifications, support access requests, and—in the case of writable connectors—provision changes back to the external system.

SailPoint's current source-management documentation explicitly defines a source as the Identity Security Cloud representation of a third-party enterprise application, database, or directory-management system maintaining its own user accounts or personnel records.

This distinction between source and connector is important: the source is the governed system representation, while the connector provides the technical mechanism used to communicate with that system.

Study Guide Reference: Sources — Source Definitions, Connector Definitions, Source Accounts and Enterprise System Integration.

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The statement is valid. Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) strengthens authentication by requiring more than a single verification mechanism before access is granted. Authentication factors are generally categorized as something the user knows, something the user possesses, or something the user inherently is. Requiring multiple factors substantially reduces the effectiveness of a compromised password because possession of that password alone is insufficient to complete authentication.

Identity Security Cloud supports MFA through an external authenticator application. When MFA is configured for an Identity Profile, affected users register an authenticator and subsequently provide a generated verification code during authentication. SailPoint also distinguishes sign-in MFA from two-factor verification used for password resets and account unlocking, where administrators can explicitly require users to complete two configured verification methods.

Therefore, the video's characterization of MFA as requiring two or more forms of verification correctly reflects the underlying security principle. MFA should not be confused with authorization: authentication establishes identity, whereas authorization determines what authenticated identities are permitted to access.

Study Guide Reference: Access Management — Multifactor Authentication, Authentication Factors, Strong Authentication and Identity Profile Sign-In Methods.

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The statement is incorrect because Governance Groups are not restricted to serving only as the primary owner of a Separation of Duties policy. Identity Security Cloud provides multiple ownership and governance assignments within SoD policy configuration.

For the Policy Owner , an administrator can select either an individual identity or a Governance Group. A policy can additionally have up to ten co-owners, and those co-owners may also include individuals or Governance Groups. Furthermore, the Violation Owner —the party responsible for handling violations generated by the policy—can be configured as an individual, an identity's manager, a Governance Group, or no explicitly selected owner, in which case responsibility can fall to the policy owner. SailPoint's current policy configuration documentation explicitly identifies these distinct ownership options.

Governance Groups are also used outside SoD policies. They can participate in access-request approvals, source ownership/governance, certification-related responsibilities, and scoped administration.

Therefore, saying Governance Groups can only be assigned as policy owners incorrectly limits their supported governance functions.

Study Guide Reference: Supporting Governance — Governance Groups, SoD Policy Ownership, Co-Owners and Violation Ownership.

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This is a valid description of Separation of Duties (SoD) as an identity-governance control. SoD policies define combinations of access that should not be held by the same identity because combining those privileges could enable fraud, unauthorized transactions, or circumvention of internal controls. A detective implementation analyzes existing access and identifies identities that already violate a defined policy, allowing administrators to investigate, mitigate, revoke access, or document an approved exception.

Preventive policy evaluation applies the same governance principle before problematic access is granted. During an access-request or provisioning process, the proposed access can be evaluated against policy rules so that a potential conflict is identified before the access change is completed. SailPoint documents SoD policies as conflicting-access definitions and also documents preventive policy evaluation in its governance model. These controls provide measurable evidence that an organization is actively enforcing access-risk policies rather than merely documenting them.

Study Guide Reference: Supporting Governance — Separation of Duties, Policy Rules, Detective and Preventive Controls.

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This is a valid troubleshooting action. Identity Security Cloud provides administrators with centralized visibility into pending access requests through Approval Management / Approvals Administration . An administrator can select an access request and inspect its processing details rather than relying only on the status visible to the requester.

The request's Process view displays the progression of the approval and provisioning workflow. It identifies completed, active, and future steps and can show which approver or governance group currently owns an outstanding review. Where multiple reviewers are involved, administrators can expand approval stages to inspect individual reviewer status. The Assignees information also identifies who is currently responsible for approving the request.

This makes the administrative view particularly useful when a request appears "stuck." The administrator can determine whether it is waiting for approval, escalation, provisioning, or another processing stage and then take an appropriate supported action such as reminding or reassigning an approver.

Therefore, reviewing the request's administrative process flow is an appropriate first-line diagnostic step.

Study Guide Reference: Access Management — Approvals Administration, Tracking Access Requests, Approval Workflow and Pending Request Troubleshooting.

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This can be a valid reason, depending on the manager-review campaign mechanism being used. In a search-based certification campaign where Manager is selected as the reviewer, Identity Security Cloud determines the reviewer from each identity's manager relationship. If an identity does not have a manager defined, SailPoint documents that the certification is reassigned to the creator of the campaign . If the campaign creator is an administrator, the certification therefore appears assigned to that administrator instead of a manager.

The absence of a manager can originate from authoritative HR data, an incomplete manager attribute mapping, failed manager correlation, or otherwise missing manager information on the identity.

A distinction is important: traditional Manager Campaigns require identities to have managers defined and identities without managers are normally excluded. SailPoint recommends using a Search-based campaign with Manager selected as reviewer when identities without managers must still be included.

Given the scenario explicitly states that the certification was reassigned to an admin, missing manager information is therefore a technically valid explanation for the observed fallback assignment.

Study Guide Reference: Supporting Governance — Certifications, Manager Review, Search-Based Campaigns and Identities Without Managers.

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The statement correctly describes Identity Security Cloud's default self-approval prevention behavior when the requester is assigned as an individual reviewer . SailPoint does not normally permit a person to approve their own access request. This applies whether the request is submitted directly for themselves or whether the affected access recipient otherwise appears as a reviewer in the approval sequence.

When the requester or recipient is assigned an approval directly as an individual, Identity Security Cloud automatically reassigns that review responsibility to the individual's manager . If a valid manager is unavailable, the system can continue through alternative fallback mechanisms, eventually reaching an administrator when necessary.

There is an important distinction for Governance Groups: if the requester belongs to a Governance Group configured as reviewer, the requester is normally omitted while other group members remain eligible to approve. Only when that user is effectively the group's sole valid reviewer does manager reassignment occur.

An optional API setting can permit auto-approval for individual reviewers, but the default behavior described by the scenario is manager reassignment.

Study Guide Reference: Access Management — Preventing Self-Approval, Approval Reassignment, Manager Review and Access Request Governance.

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Yes. This is a classic Separation of Duties scenario. The individual requesting a significant system configuration change should not also possess the authority to independently approve that same change. Combining requester and approver responsibilities eliminates an important independent-control checkpoint and allows one person to initiate and authorize a potentially high-impact administrative operation.

SailPoint's official SoD guidance specifically uses major system configuration changes as an example: significant configuration changes should be approved by someone other than the person requesting the change. SoD policies are designed to identify and govern combinations of access that would enable such conflicting responsibilities.

From a governance perspective, the requester initiates the business or technical need, while an independent reviewer determines whether the requested change is appropriate, authorized, and sufficiently controlled. Separating these functions reduces fraud, accidental misconfiguration, privilege abuse, and unauthorized system modification. Where conflicting access already exists, Identity Security Cloud can identify the associated SoD violation for investigation and remediation.

Therefore, allowing the requester to approve their own major system change represents exactly the type of control conflict that SoD is intended to prevent.

Study Guide Reference: Supporting Governance — Separation of Duties, Requester/Approver Conflicts, Internal Controls and SoD Policy Enforcement.

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This statement is correct. An uncorrelated account is a source account that Identity Security Cloud has been unable to associate with an existing identity by using the configured account-correlation criteria. SailPoint provides a supported manual-correlation process for resolving these accounts.

From the source's Uncorrelated Accounts area, an administrator can select Download Correlation File to obtain a CSV containing the uncorrelated accounts. The administrator then adds the appropriate identity Account IDs to the designated userName column beside each account that needs to be correlated. After saving the modified CSV, it can be uploaded back through the Uncorrelated Accounts page. Identity Security Cloud processes the file and creates permanent manual associations between the specified source accounts and identities.

Manual correlation differs from ordinary correlation rules because a manually correlated account remains attached to that identity even if source attributes later change. To associate it with another identity, the manual correlation must first be removed or explicitly changed.

Therefore, the download-edit-upload procedure described in the proposed statement is an officially supported method.

Study Guide Reference: Identity and Lifecycle Management — Account Correlation, Uncorrelated Accounts, Manual Correlation and Identity Assignment.

The statement is incorrect. Identity Security Cloud does not use majority voting within a Governance Group for an access-request approval step. When a Governance Group is configured as a reviewer, only one eligible member of that Governance Group is required to approve or deny the request on behalf of the group .

SailPoint explains that when an access request reaches a Governance Group, its members receive the applicable review assignment. Once one member makes the decision, the review is treated as completed for that Governance Group and disappears from the other members' pending approval lists.

This should not be confused with a multi-step approval process containing several separate reviewers. If the access item is configured with multiple required reviewer stages, each required stage must approve before provisioning occurs. However, a Governance Group itself represents one reviewer stage, and that stage does not require approval from 50%, a majority, or every member.

Therefore, requiring a majority of Governance Group members is not how standard Identity Security Cloud Governance Group approvals operate.

Study Guide Reference: Access Management — Governance Group Approvals, Access Requests, Multi-Approver Processes and Group Review Decisions.

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The statement is incorrect. A source in Identity Security Cloud is not primarily a backup-storage repository. A source represents an enterprise system from which Identity Security Cloud obtains account, identity, and access information or to which it performs supported provisioning operations.

SailPoint defines a source as the Identity Security Cloud representation of a third-party enterprise application, database, or directory-management system that maintains its own accounts or personnel records. Connectors are used to interact with those systems so Identity Security Cloud can aggregate accounts and access rights and associate that information with identities.

Examples include Active Directory, HR applications, databases, SaaS platforms, and flat-file feeds. Depending on connector capabilities and configuration, a source can support account aggregation, entitlement aggregation, account creation and modification, enable/disable operations, password management, and entitlement provisioning.

Backup and disaster-recovery functions are separate concerns. Configuration Hub, for example, backs up supported Identity Security Cloud configuration objects , but that does not redefine enterprise sources as backup systems.

Study Guide Reference: Sources — Source Definitions, Connectors, Account and Entitlement Aggregation, Source Management.

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1. Section of the UI that allows users to ask for access.

Select a match:

Answer: Request Center

2. Provide an interface to read user account data and provision changes from Identity Security Cloud to target systems and applications.

Select a match:

Answer: Direct Connection

3. A ticket is created in ServiceNow and assigned to the operations team that manages the source application.

Select a match:

Answer: Service Desk Integration

4. A task is created and assigned to a source owner to provision the users' access being requested.

Select a match:

Answer: Manual work Item

Request Center is the end-user interface through which users browse and request configured roles, access profiles, and entitlements. Direct Connection represents the connection model through which Identity Security Cloud communicates with a managed source and, when provisioning is supported and enabled, performs changes directly rather than requiring manual intervention. SailPoint distinguishes directly connected sources from flat-file/manual provisioning sources.

Service Desk Integration is appropriate when fulfillment is delegated to an external service-management platform such as ServiceNow. The resulting ticket is routed to the operational team responsible for implementing the requested change. Manual work Item applies when Identity Security Cloud cannot automatically provision the requested change; instead, a provisioning task is assigned to the responsible source or entitlement owner for completion outside the automated connector path. SailPoint explicitly documents manual provisioning tasks for sources that cannot be automatically written to.

Study Guide Reference: Provisioning — Provisioning Methods, Direct Connections, Manual Provisioning, Service Desk Integration and Request Center.

Yes. Identity Security Cloud's Account Activity view is designed to provide administrators with a chronological operational view of provisioning actions. SailPoint documents that account activities are displayed by default in descending order of Last Modified date , which places the most recently updated provisioning activity first. This is useful during troubleshooting because current or recently failed operations are immediately visible.

The activity table exposes operational fields such as Status, Action, Requester, Recipient, Sources, Last Modified, and Stage. Administrators can use the tabular controls to reorganize the displayed information for analysis, including changing sort direction on sortable columns. This makes it possible to investigate provisioning operations from perspectives other than chronological order—for example, grouping similar requesters, recipients, sources, statuses, or actions.

Selecting an individual activity exposes additional request information, including provisioning errors and the progression of the request through its processing stages. This capability is important when determining whether an account create, modify, enable, disable, or entitlement operation completed successfully or stalled.

Study Guide Reference: Provisioning — Monitoring Provisioning, Account Activity, Last Modified Sorting and Provisioning Troubleshooting.

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This is a valid method for enabling connector-level logging on the relevant VA managed cluster. The log entry shows that the acme AD-TX Cluster currently has logConfiguration: null, meaning no temporary connector logging configuration is active for that cluster. The Managed Clusters API supports a PUT request to /managed-clusters/{id}/log-config to establish or update logging configuration.

The proposed durationMinutes value of 365 is valid because SailPoint supports a logging duration from 5 through 1,440 minutes. DEBUG is also a supported Log4j level, and sailpoint.connector.ADLDAPConnector is the appropriate connector logging class for Active Directory/LDAP connector activity. Once enabled, the administrator can reproduce the problematic aggregation and obtain substantially more diagnostic information than would be available under normal logging.

Importantly, enhanced logging should generally be enabled only for the troubleshooting period because verbose connector logging increases log volume. SailPoint's current API explicitly supports this managed-cluster logging operation and temporary duration control.

Study Guide Reference: Virtual Appliances — Connector Logging, Managed Cluster Log Configuration, Active Directory Troubleshooting.

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This is an appropriate corrective action for a PKIX certification-path failure. When the Active Directory connector communicates with a domain controller using TLS, the Virtual Appliance must trust the certificate presented by that server. A PKIX path validation failed or unable to find valid certification path to requested target error indicates that Java cannot construct a trusted certificate chain from the server certificate to a trusted certification authority.

Consequently, verifying that the correct CA or server certificate is available to the VA is a fundamental troubleshooting step. SailPoint supports TLS between Virtual Appliances and compatible sources and documents certificate management on the VA for situations where trusted certificates need to be added manually. Current configuration also attempts to copy supported TLS certificates automatically to the VA cluster, but administrators must still validate certificate trust when TLS handshakes fail.

The certificate chain, expiration, hostname, and issuing CA should also be checked. Once the VA trusts the appropriate chain, the TLS handshake can complete successfully.

Study Guide Reference: Virtual Appliances — TLS Configuration, Certificate Trust, Active Directory Secure Connectivity and PKIX Troubleshooting.

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This is an appropriate diagnostic method within the Search model represented by the course scenario. The query narrows the investigation to events associated with provisioning, filters for events containing errors, constrains the timeframe to the date on which the failure occurred, and associates the result with the affected identity, Clarence.Harper. Opening the corresponding event allows the administrator to investigate the contextual information associated with the failed provisioning operation.

The underlying troubleshooting principle remains central to Identity Security Cloud administration: provisioning failures should be correlated with audit events and account activity rather than evaluated only from the short error message shown in a dashboard. SailPoint Search contains audit-event information and supports filtering against event data. Event records can provide operation details, status, target information, source context, and additional attributes. SailPoint also provides a Provisioning Activity audit-report capability specifically for reviewing provisioning events.

Study Guide Reference: Provisioning — Monitoring Provisioning, Search and Audit Events, Troubleshooting Failed Provisioning Operations.

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Yes. This is an appropriate scenario for applying Separation of Duties (SoD). The fundamental purpose of SoD is to prevent a single identity from accumulating combinations of privileges that provide excessive control over a sensitive business or technical process. Assigning one person responsibility for user administration, application administration, and data backup management creates significant concentration of privilege. Such a person could potentially create or modify accounts, change application configuration or permissions, and manipulate or restore protected data without independent oversight.

Identity Security Cloud supports SoD policies by defining two sets of conflicting access. A violation occurs when an identity possesses qualifying access from both sides of the policy. Administrators can then investigate, remediate, or formally manage exceptions. SailPoint describes SoD as an internal control intended to reduce risk by preventing identities from possessing inappropriate combinations of access.

Therefore, separating these powerful administrative capabilities among different responsible individuals is consistent with least privilege and defense-in-depth governance.

Study Guide Reference: Supporting Governance — Separation of Duties, Conflicting Access, SoD Policies and Privileged Access Governance.

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Yes. SailPoint explicitly documents that an individual Identity Security Cloud user can maintain up to 10 Personal Access Tokens (PATs) . PATs provide client credentials that can be used by scripts, applications, integrations, and API tools to authenticate to Identity Security Cloud without requiring an interactive login for each API request.

Each PAT has its own Client ID and Secret and can therefore be dedicated to a particular integration or automation workload. Separating tokens by purpose improves security administration because one compromised or obsolete integration token can be revoked without disrupting unrelated systems. Administrators should use meaningful descriptions, appropriate expiration dates, and the minimum required API scopes for each token.

The token's secret is displayed when the PAT is created and must be securely recorded at that time because the secret cannot subsequently be retrieved from the interface. A lost secret requires replacement of the affected token. Identity Security Cloud also records information such as token usage, enabling administrators to identify unused credentials that should be removed.

Study Guide Reference: Platform — Personal Access Tokens, API Authentication, Token Limits, Scope Management and Credential Security.

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Certificate-based authentication is a valid authentication mechanism for verifying both user and device identities. It relies on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), in which a trusted Certificate Authority issues a digital certificate containing the subject's public key and identifying information. During authentication, the certificate holder demonstrates possession of the corresponding private key, and the receiving system validates the certificate's trust chain, validity period, revocation status, intended use, and other policy requirements.

This model can authenticate individual users through certificates stored on smart cards, security tokens, or endpoint certificate stores. The same mechanism can authenticate managed computers, servers, and other devices by issuing device-specific certificates. Because the private key does not need to be transmitted to the authenticating service, certificate-based authentication provides stronger resistance to credential theft than reusable passwords when implemented correctly.

The statement therefore accurately describes a recognized authentication method applicable within broader enterprise identity and access-management architectures.

Study Guide Reference: Access Management — Authentication Methods, Certificate-Based Authentication, PKI and Strong Authentication.

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This is not the correct remediation mechanism for the certificate-path error described. Active Directory source configuration allows administrators to enable Transport Layer Security (TLS) for supported connections, but the source's TLS configuration is not simply a certificate-upload repository used to resolve a Java PKIX trust failure.

The underlying problem is that the Virtual Appliance performing the TLS connection cannot validate the certificate chain presented by Active Directory. Trust must therefore exist in the VA's applicable certificate trust location. SailPoint documentation states that when TLS is enabled for a supported source, the applicable certificate should normally be copied automatically to the associated VA cluster. Where manual remediation is required, certificate trust is handled at the VA level rather than by arbitrarily uploading an AD certificate to a source TLS settings page.

Administrators should verify the server certificate, issuing CA chain, hostname correspondence, and the trusted certificates available to the VA. Changing source settings without resolving VA trust will leave the TLS handshake failure unresolved.

Study Guide Reference: Virtual Appliances — TLS Configuration on VAs, Certificate Trust, Active Directory TLS Troubleshooting.

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The statement is incorrect. Identity Security Cloud does not automatically transfer a departed reviewer's certification responsibilities to that reviewer's manager merely because of the reporting relationship. Certification ownership is explicitly assigned, and the authorized replacement process is reassignment rather than implicit managerial inheritance.

If the original reviewer cannot finish a certification, an administrator can reassign that pending certification to another qualified identity. Identity Security Cloud validates the reassignment to prevent the new reviewer from certifying their own access. A manager can also configure work reassignment for their team members when that functionality is enabled, but that still establishes an explicit reassignment rather than granting the manager unrestricted authority to enter every certification belonging to the employee.

After a campaign deadline, administrators also have campaign-level options for resolving undecided items, including completing the campaign according to the configured maintain-or-revoke behavior.

Therefore, the correct response to a departed reviewer is to use supported reassignment or campaign-completion procedures, not assume the reviewer's manager automatically acquires all pending certifications.

Study Guide Reference: Supporting Governance — Certification Reassignment, Work Reassignment, Campaign Deadlines and Reviewer Responsibilities.

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This is a valid troubleshooting action because the error explicitly identifies an invalid email-address value during provisioning. When Identity Security Cloud creates an account on a source, the Create Account configuration determines which account attributes are populated and how their values are calculated.

SailPoint allows each Create Account attribute to derive its value from an identity attribute, generator, static value, or other supported provisioning configuration. For example, the source's email account attribute can be mapped directly to the identity's Work Email value. If that mapping references the wrong identity attribute, produces an incorrectly formatted value, or uses a defective generator or transformation, the target source can reject the provisioning operation.

The administrator should therefore inspect Admin > Connections > Sources > Account Management > Create Account , locate the email-related source attribute, validate its mapping, and inspect the affected identity's source value. The conflicting-action portion of the error should also be reviewed in Account Activity, but the explicit email validation failure makes the account-creation mapping a direct troubleshooting target.

Study Guide Reference: Provisioning — Create Account Configuration, Account Attribute Mappings, Provisioning Validation and Provisioning Troubleshooting.

The statement is incorrect because Attribute Sync does not synchronize entitlement information from a source into Identity Security Cloud. Its purpose is to keep selected source account attributes synchronized with corresponding identity attributes maintained in Identity Security Cloud.

For example, an organization's authoritative identity data might contain a user's department, title, or other business attribute. If a corresponding account attribute on a connected target source is configured for Attribute Sync, Identity Security Cloud can detect that the account value no longer matches the identity value and provision an update to the source account. SailPoint explicitly states that Attribute Sync uses identity information to keep account data on sources consistent with identity data.

Entitlements are handled through separate aggregation mechanisms. Entitlement aggregation imports entitlement objects and their metadata from external sources into Identity Security Cloud.

Therefore, the proposed statement confuses two distinct processes: Attribute Sync pushes identity-derived account-attribute changes toward target accounts, whereas entitlement aggregation loads entitlement information from governed sources.

Study Guide Reference: Provisioning — Attribute Synchronization, Identity-to-Account Attribute Mapping and Entitlement Aggregation.

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