SC-300 Sample Questions Answers

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and the Microsoft Learn module “Implement and manage synchronization for Azure AD”, Azure AD Connect Cloud Sync is the preferred solution when you need to synchronize objects from multiple Active Directory (AD DS) forests without establishing forest trusts.

The scenario specifies that trust relationships must NOT be established between adatum.com and litware.com, but A. Datum must still sync the AD DS users and groups of litware.com to their existing Azure AD tenant (adatum.com).

The SC-300 training materials clarify:

“Azure AD Connect cloud sync enables syncing from multiple AD forests to a single Azure AD tenant without the need for forest trusts or a full Azure AD Connect installation in each forest.”

Unlike staging mode (which provides a standby sync server for failover) or extending the same Azure AD Connect instance to another domain (which requires trust relationships and network connectivity between forests), Azure AD Connect Cloud Sync uses lightweight agents and does not depend on forest trust.

Therefore, to meet the requirement of syncing Litware’s AD DS to A. Datum’s Azure AD tenant without creating a trust, the correct choice is to configure Azure AD Connect Cloud Sync between the Azure AD tenant and the litware.com domain.

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator official study guide and the Microsoft Learn module “Manage user and group licenses in Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD)”, when you need to automatically assign licenses to users based on specific attributes (such as department, location, or a custom attribute like LWLicenses), you should use a Dynamic User Security Group in Azure Active Directory (Entra ID).

In the scenario, Litware wants to:

“Manage the assignment of Azure AD licenses by modifying the value of the LWLicenses attribute. Users who have the appropriate value for LWLicenses must be added automatically to the Microsoft 365 group that has the appropriate license assigned.”

This requirement directly maps to a Dynamic User security group, which supports dynamic membership rules that automatically include users when their attributes meet defined conditions (for example, user.extensionAttribute15 -eq "E5"). When a license is assigned to this dynamic group, Azure AD automatically provisions or removes licenses for members based on their attribute values — eliminating manual license management.

Per Microsoft documentation:

“You can assign licenses to a group that has dynamic membership. When a user’s attributes change, Azure AD automatically adds or removes them from the group, which updates their license assignments accordingly.”

Now, analyzing the other options:

B. An OU (Organizational Unit): Used in on-premises Active Directory, not Azure AD. It cannot manage cloud-based license assignments.

C. A Distribution Group: Used for email distribution in Exchange Online; cannot be used for license assignment.

D. An Administrative Unit: Used for scoping administrative permissions, not for license assignment.

Therefore, the only object type that satisfies both the technical and automation requirements is a Dynamic User Security Group.

✅ Correct Answer: A. A Dynamic User security group

To ensure that users in the Sg-Operations group see a tab named “Operations” containing only LinkedIn and Box applications in the My Apps portal, you can create a collection with these specific applications. Here’s how to do it:

Sign in to the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Make sure you have one of the following roles: Global Administrator, Cloud Application Administrator, Application Administrator, or owner of the service principal.

Navigate to App launchers:

Go to Identity > Applications > Enterprise applications.

Under Manage, select App launchers.

Create a new collection:

Click on New collection.

Enter “Operations” as the Name for the collection.

Provide a Description if necessary.

Add applications to the collection:

Select the Applications tab within the new collection.

Click on + Add application.

Search for and select LinkedIn and Box applications.

Click Add to include them in the collection.

Assign the collection to the Sg-Operations group:

Select the Users and groups tab.

Click on + Add users and groups.

Search for and select the Sg-Operations group.

Click Select to assign the collection to the group.

Review and create the collection:

Select Review + Create to check the configuration.

If everything is correct, click Create to finalize the collection.

By following these steps, when users in the Sg-Operations group visit the My Apps portal, they will see a new tab named “Operations” that contains only the LinkedIn and Box applications1.

Please note that to create collections on the My Apps portal, you need a Microsoft Entra ID P1 or P2 license1.

To implement additional security checks for the Sg-Executive group members before they canaccess any company apps, you can use Conditional Access policies in Microsoft Entra. Here’s a step-by-step guide:

Sign in to the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Ensure you have the role of Global Administrator or Security Administrator.

Navigate to Conditional Access:

Go to Security > Conditional Access.

Create a new policy:

Select + New policy.

Name the policy appropriately, such as “Sg-Executive Security Checks”.

Assign the policy to the Sg-Executive group:

Under Assignments, select Users and groups.

Choose Select users and groups and then Groups.

Search for and select the Sg-Executive group.

Define the application control conditions:

Under Cloud apps or actions, select All cloud apps to apply the policy to any company app.

Set the device compliance requirement:

Under Conditions > Device state, configure the policy to include devices marked as compliant by Microsoft Intune.

Set the app protection policy requirement:

Under Conditions > Client apps, configure the policy to include client apps that are protected by app protection policies.

Configure the access controls:

Under Access controls > Grant, select Grant access.

Choose Require device to be marked as compliant and Require approved client app.

Ensure that the option Require one of the selected controls is enabled.

Enable the policy:

Set Enable policy to On.

Review and save the policy:

Review all settings to ensure they meet the requirements.

Click Create to save and implement the policy.

By following these steps, you will ensure that the Sg-Executive group members can only access company apps if they meet one of the specified conditions, either by using a compliant device or a protected client app. This enhances the security posture of your organization by enforcing stricter access controls for executive-level users.

To prevent all users from using legacy authentication protocols when authenticating to Microsoft Entra ID, you can create a Conditional Access policy that blocks legacy authentication. Here’s how to do it:

Sign in to the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Ensure you have the role of Global Administrator or Conditional Access Administrator.

Navigate to Conditional Access:

Go to Security > Conditional Access.

Create a new policy:

Select + New policy.

Give your policy a name that reflects its purpose, like “Block Legacy Auth”.

Set users and groups:

Under Assignments, select Users or workload identities.

Under Include, select All users.

Under Exclude, select Users and groups and choose any accounts that must maintain the ability to use legacy authentication.It’s recommended to exclude at least one account to prevent lockout1.

Target resources:

Under Cloud apps or actions, select All cloud apps.

Set conditions:

Under Conditions > Client apps, set Configure to Yes.

Check only the boxes for Exchange ActiveSync clients and Other clients.

Configure access controls:

Under Access controls > Grant, select Block access.

Enable policy:

Confirm your settings and set Enable policy to Report-only initially to understand the impact.

After confirming the settings using report-only mode, you can move theEnable policytoggle fromReport-onlytoOn2.

By following these steps, you will block legacy authentication protocols for all users, enhancing the security posture of your organization by requiring modern authentication methods. Remember to monitor the impact of this policy and adjust as necessary to ensure business continuity.

To ensure that all users can consent to apps that require permission to read their user profile and prevent them from consenting to apps that require any other permissions, you can configure the user consent settings in the Microsoft Entra admin center. Here’s how you can do it:

Sign in as a Global Administrator:

Access the Microsoft Entra admin center with Global Administrator privileges.

Navigate to user consent settings:

Go toIdentity>Applications>Enterprise applications>Consent and permissions>User consent settings1.

Configure the consent settings:

Under User consent for applications, select the option that allows users to consent to apps that only require permission to read their user profile.

Ensure that all other permissions are set to require administrator consent, thus preventing users from consenting to apps that require additional permissions1.

Save the settings:

After configuring the consent settings, select Save to apply the changes.

By following these steps, you will have configured the system to allow user consent for apps that need to read the user profile while blocking consent for apps that require additional permissions. This setup helps maintain user autonomy where appropriate while safeguarding against unauthorized access to broader permissions.

To deploy Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for only the members of the Sg-Finance group, excluding Debra Berger, and without using a Conditional Access policy, you can follow these steps:

Open the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Sign in as a Security Administrator or Global Administrator.

Navigate to MFA settings:

Go to Users > Active users.

On the Active users page, select Multi-factor authentication.

Manage user settings:

Find and select the Sg-Finance group.

Enable MFA for this group by setting the requirement status to Enabled.

Exclude a user from MFA:

In the Multi-factor authentication page, search for Debra Berger.

Set her MFA status to Disabled to exclude her from MFA registration.

Verify the configuration:

Ensure that all members of the Sg-Finance group have MFA enabled except for Debra Berger.

Communicate the change:

Inform the Sg-Finance group members about the MFA requirement and provide instructions on how to register for MFA.

Monitor the setup:

Check the sign-in logs to confirm that MFA is being prompted for the Sg-Finance group members and not for Debra Berger.

To create a group named “Audit” and ensure that its members can activate the Security Reader role, follow these steps:

Open the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Sign in with an account that has the Security Administrator or Global Administrator role.

Navigate to Groups:

Go toTeams & groups>Active teams and groups1.

Create the security group:

Select Add a security group.

On the Set up the basics page, enter “Audit” as the group name.

Add a description if necessary and chooseNext1.

Edit settings:

On theEdit settingspage, select whether you want Microsoft Entra roles to be assignable to this group and selectNext1.

Assign roles:

After creating the group, go to Roles > All roles.

Find and select the Security Reader role.

Under Assignments, choose Assign.

Select the “Audit” group to assign the role to its members2.

Review and finish:

Review the settings to ensure the “Audit” group is created with the ability for its members to activate the Security Reader role.

Finish the setup and save the changes.

By following these steps, you will have created the “Audit” group and enabled its members to activate the Security Reader role, which allows them to view security-related information without having permissions to change it. Remember to communicate the new group and role assignment to the relevant stakeholders in your organization.

To add the LinkedIn application as a resource to the Sales and Marketing access package without removing any other resources, you can follow these steps:

Sign in to the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Ensure you have the role of Global Administrator or Identity Governance Administrator.

Navigate to Entitlement Management:

Go to Identity governance > Entitlement management > Access packages1.

Select the Sales and Marketing access package:

Find and select the Sales and Marketing access package to modify it.

Add a new resource:

Within the access package details, select Resources.

Click on + Add resource.

Search for and select the LinkedIn application from the list of available resources.

Configure the resource role:

Assign the appropriate role for the LinkedIn application that users in the Sales and Marketing access package will have.

Review and update the access package:

Ensure that the LinkedIn application has been added as a resource.

Confirm that no other resources have been removed from the access package.

Save the changes:

After reviewing, save the changes to the access package.

Communicate the update:

Notify the relevant users about the addition of the LinkedIn application to their access package.

By following these steps, you will successfully add the LinkedIn application to the Sales and Marketing access package without affecting the other resources.

To implement a process for reviewing guest users’ access to the Salesforce app with the specified requirements, you can use Microsoft Entra’s Identity Governance access reviews feature. Here’s a step-by-step guide:

Assign the appropriate role:

Ensure you have one of the following roles: Global Administrator, User Administrator, or Identity Governance Administrator1.

Navigate to Identity Governance:

Sign in to the Microsoft Entra admin center.

Go toIdentity governance>Access reviews1.

Create a new access review:

Select New access review.

Choose the Salesforce app to review guest user access1.

Configure the review settings:

Set the frequency of the review to monthly.

Define thedurationof the review period to5 days1.

Determine the reviewers:

Assign the manager of each guest user as the reviewer.

If a guest user does not have a manager, assignMegan Bowenas the reviewer1.

Automate the removal process:

Configure settings toautomatically remove accessif the review is not completed within the specified time frame1.

Monitor and enforce compliance:

Regularly check the access review results to ensure compliance with the review policy1.

Communicate the process:

Inform all stakeholders about the new review process and provide guidance on how to complete the reviews.

By following these steps, you can ensure that guest users’ access to the Salesforce app is reviewed monthly, with managers being responsible for the review, and access is removed if the review is not completed in time.

To configure the account lockout settings so that accounts are locked out for five minutes after 10 failed sign-in attempts, you can follow these steps:

Open the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Sign in with an account that has the Security Administrator or Global Administrator role.

Navigate to the lockout settings:

Go to Security > Authentication methods > Password protection.

Adjust the Smart Lockout settings:

Set the Lockout threshold to 10 failed sign-in attempts.

Set the Lockout duration (in minutes) to 5.

Please note that by default, smart lockout locks an account from sign-in after 10 failed attempts in Azure Public and Microsoft Azure operated by 21Vianet tenants1. The lockout period is one minute at first, and longer in subsequent attempts.However, you can customize these settings tomeet your organization’s requirements if you have Microsoft Entra ID P1 or higher licenses for your users1.

According to the Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator (SC-300) Exam Ref and the Azure AD Dynamic Membership Rules documentation, when you create a dynamic group in Azure Active Directory (now Entra ID), you define rules that automatically add or remove users based on their attributes.

The scenario requires a group named LWGroup1 that contains all Azure AD user accounts for Litware but excludes all guest accounts. In Azure AD, internal users created within the tenant are designated with the attribute user.userType = "Member", while external or guest accounts from partner organizations have user.userType = "Guest".

To ensure only internal (Litware) users are included, the membership rule must:

Ensure the user object exists — by checking (user.objectId -ne null) which confirms that the rule only applies to valid user objects.

Include only members, excluding guests — by filtering with (user.userType -eq "Member").

Hence, the dynamic rule that satisfies these conditions is:

(user.objectId -ne null) and (user.userType -eq "Member")

This rule guarantees that LWGroup1 dynamically includes all internal users from litware.com and excludes all external users or guest accounts (such as Fabrikam users).

This logic aligns precisely with the Microsoft Learn module “Manage groups in Azure Active Directory” and SC-300 study guide section “Implement and manage dynamic membership rules”, which states:

“Use user.userType to distinguish between internal members and external guests when configuring membership rules for dynamic groups.”

✅ Correct Answer:

(user.objectId -ne null) and (user.userType -eq "Member")

To assign a Windows 10/11 Enterprise E3 license to the Sg-Retail group, you can follow these steps:

Sign in to the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Make sure you have the role of Global Administrator or License Administrator.

Navigate to the licensing page:

Go toBilling>Licenses1.

Find the Windows 10/11 Enterprise E3 license:

Look for the Windows 10/11 Enterprise E3 license in the list of available products.

Assign licenses to the group:

Select the license and then choose Assign licenses.

Search for and select the Sg-Retail group.

Confirm the assignment and make sure that the correct number of licenses is available for the group.

Review and confirm the assignment:

Ensure that the licenses have been properly assigned to the Sg-Retail group without affecting other groups or users.

Monitor the license status:

Check the license usage and status to ensure that the Sg-Retail group members can utilize the Windows 10/11 Enterprise E3 features.

By following these steps, the Sg-Retail group should now have the Windows 10/11 Enterprise E3 licenses assigned to them.

In Azure AD Identity Governance, application access granted through Entitlement management is organized around catalogs and access packages. The SC-300 study materials explain that “a catalog is a container for resources and access packages” and that you must add your enterprise applications (or the groups tied to those apps) to a catalog before you can build access packages that users can request. Creating the catalog first enables you to place only the required resources in scope and to delegate day-to-day ownership: “catalog owners can manage the resources and access packages within their catalog without being tenant-wide admins,” satisfying the delegation requirement to use custom catalogs and least privilege. After the catalog exists, you create one or more access packages that include the application (or groups) and policies that control who can request, how they are approved, and for how long. Identity Governance then lets you track access package assignments and review who has the app over time. By contrast, programs are used to group and report on governance initiatives (for example, collections of access reviews) rather than to onboard application resources; and modifying user/admin consent settings affects app consent behavior, not the lifecycle tracking of assignments. Therefore, the correct first step to track application access assignments while meeting the delegation requirements is to create a catalog.

Server1

On DC1

Azure AD Password Protection has two components: the DC agent (installed on domain controllers) and the proxy service (installed on one or more member servers). The SC-300 materials and Microsoft Identity Governance guidance explain that the proxy service is required when domain controllers do not have direct internet access. The proxy retrieves the password protection policy and custom banned password list from Azure AD over outbound HTTPS and makes it available to DC agents. The documentation further states that you should deploy at least one proxy per forest and two for high availability, and that domain controllers do not need internet connectivity when a proxy is deployed. In this scenario, DCs are explicitly blocked from internet access, so the proxy must be placed on member servers. Both SERVER1 (Application Proxy connector) and SERVER2 (Azure AD Connect) are domain-joined member servers with internet connectivity and are appropriate locations for the AzureADPasswordProtectionProxy service; selecting both provides the recommended redundancy. The custom banned password list is configured in Azure AD at the tenant level (as part of Azure AD Password Protection settings), not on individual servers. Once configured, the policy and list are downloaded by the proxy and enforced by the DC agent during password set or change operations, satisfying the requirement to implement a banned password list for the litware.com forest.

SC-300 materials stress that to enforce modern controls (like MFA) on on-premises apps, you must front them with Azure AD so Conditional Access can evaluate sign-ins. The documentation states that Azure AD Application Proxy “provides secure remote access to on-premises applications” and that apps published through it can have “Conditional Access policies, including multifactor authentication” applied at sign-in. In other words, once the legacy app is published by Application Proxy, Azure AD sits in the path, enabling you to meet the requirement to enforce MFA when accessing on-premises applications and to combine it with your location-based exemptions.

For SharePoint Online restrictions, SC-300 points to Microsoft Cloud App Security (Defender for Cloud Apps) for real-time governance: you can create session policies that “control and limit activities in real time” and, for SharePoint Online and other Microsoft 365 apps, “monitor user sessions and block download, cut, copy, and print” when conditions (device state, risk, or location) warrant it. Since the scenario already has anomaly detections enabled, configuring Cloud App Security policies aligns directly with the requirement to place access restrictions on SharePoint Online without altering tenant-wide consent settings. Thus, publish on-prem apps with Application Proxy to bring them under Conditional Access (for MFA), and use Cloud App Security policies to enforce SharePoint Online session and download controls.

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and Microsoft Learn modules “Implement and manage Azure AD roles” and “Implement Privileged Identity Management (PIM)”, there is a clear distinction between Azure AD built-in roles and Azure (resource-based) built-in roles.

Azure AD built-in roles govern directory-level access — such as managing users, groups, enterprise apps, or security settings in Azure Active Directory (Entra ID).The Privileged Role Administrator role allows the user to manage role assignments for directory roles in Azure AD, including activating roles through PIM.The Global Administrator also has this capability, but the Privileged Role Administrator is the least privilege role that meets the delegation requirement — aligning with the principle of least privilege stated in the scenario.As the documentation notes:

“Privileged Role Administrator manages role assignments in Azure AD, including the ability to activate and assign roles through Azure AD Privileged Identity Management.”

Azure built-in roles, on the other hand, are used to control access at the Azure resource level — for subscriptions, resource groups, and individual resources.The role responsible for managing these assignments is the User Access Administrator.This role can grant or revoke access to Azure resources by managing role assignments within Azure RBAC (Role-Based Access Control).The Microsoft documentation states:

“User Access Administrator allows management of user access to Azure resources. It can assign roles in Azure RBAC for resources, subscriptions, and management groups.”

Therefore:

✅ To manage Azure AD built-in role assignments → Privileged role administrator

✅ To manage Azure built-in role assignments → User access administrator

This approach satisfies the delegation requirement mentioned in the scenario by assigning the least-privileged roles necessary for each type of role management task.

In SC-300, Azure AD Identity Protection is the prescribed control to “automatically detect and remediate externally leaked credentials.” That specific user risk—Leaked credentials—relies on Microsoft comparing known breached username/password pairs with what Azure AD can evaluate. The study materials explain that Identity Protection “detects leaked credentials when Microsoft finds a match with the user’s current credentials,” and also note that password hash synchronization (PHS) can be enabled even if your sign-in method is Pass-through Authentication or federation. A common exam call-out is that without PHS, Azure AD has no hash to compare, so the leaked-credential signal is unavailable. Enabling PHS (you can keep PTA as the active sign-in method) allows Identity Protection to raise user risk and enforce policy actions such as require password change or block access. By contrast, Azure AD Password Protection addresses banned/weak passwords at change time, not breached-credential telemetry; federation choices (e.g., PingFederate) don’t deliver the leaked-credential signal; and authentication method policy controls how users perform MFA (e.g., methods) rather than whether leaked credentials are detected. Therefore, to meet the requirement to “automatically detect and remediate externally leaked credentials,” the minimum correct step is to enable password hash synchronization while retaining PTA—exactly as recommended in SC-300 guidance.

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and the Microsoft Learn module “Monitor and respond to Azure AD events with Azure Sentinel”, multi-staged attacks are advanced threat scenarios that require correlation of multiple events — for example, a suspicious sign-in followed by abnormal Office 365 activity.

The scenario in the question states:

“Litware wants to use the Fusion rule in Azure Sentinel to detect multi-staged attacks that include a combination of suspicious Azure AD sign-ins followed by anomalous Microsoft Office 365 activity.”

Azure Sentinel’s Fusion rule is a built-in, machine-learning–driven correlation rule that automatically detects multi-stage attacks by analyzing anomalies across multiple data sources such as Azure AD sign-in logs, Office 365 activity, and security alerts.

However, to fine-tune detection or meet specific organizational monitoring requirements, administrators can customize the rule logic in Sentinel analytics. This allows you to define how different signals and events are correlated, what thresholds trigger an alert, and how Sentinel interprets combined anomalies.

Microsoft documentation states:

“Fusion uses correlation logic in analytics rules to detect complex multi-stage attacks. Administrators can customize rule logic to meet specific detection requirements and fine-tune alert sensitivity.”

The other options do not meet the requirement:

B. Create a workbook → Used for visualization and reporting, not detection.

C. Add data connectors → Used to ingest data sources; this is already configured.

D. Add a playbook → Used for automated response, not for detection logic configuration.

✅ Correct Answer: A. Customize the Azure Sentinel rule logic

In the SC-300 coverage of Azure AD Connect and Identity Governance, Microsoft explains that to surface a custom on-premises attribute in Azure AD you must enable Directory extensions in Azure AD Connect. The guide states that “Directory extensions lets you synchronize additional attributes from on-premises Active Directory to Azure AD so they are available in the cloud directory for apps and policy.” This is the supported way to bring a custom attribute (here, LWLicenses) from the litware.com forest into Azure AD so it can be referenced by cloud features such as dynamic group rules. Domain filtering or optional features do not expose a new attribute to Azure AD; directory extensions does.

For license automation, the SC-300 materials on group-based licensing and dynamic groups emphasize that “licenses can be assigned to Azure AD groups; group members then inherit the licenses, and when membership changes, licenses are added or removed automatically.” They further note that “dynamic user groups evaluate rules against user attributes to add or remove users without manual effort,” and that “nested groups are not supported for license inheritance—only direct members receive licenses.” Using the synced LWLicenses attribute in a Dynamic User group rule (for example, user.extensionAttribute… -eq "E5") ensures users are automatically added to the correct group and therefore receive the specified licenses without administrative intervention, fully meeting Litware’s requirement to “manage the assignment of Azure AD licenses by modifying the value of the LWLicenses attribute.”

SC-300 emphasizes using Conditional Access with named locations to scope MFA—especially to exclude trusted corporate egress IPs. The materials state that administrators can define named locations by public IP ranges and “mark them as trusted” for policy exceptions. This aligns with the requirement: enforce MFA for all users, but exempt users authenticating from the Boston office. Because Azure AD evaluates the client’s public egress address, private RFC1918 ranges are never seen by Azure AD on the internet, so defining private IP ranges would not work. Likewise, the legacy “Trusted IPs” setting belongs to the old per-user MFA service settings; SC-300 guidance prefers Conditional Access named locations for modern MFA deployments and for combining with other conditions (apps, platforms, user risk, locations). Implementing the Boston office as a named location using its public egress IP range(s), and marking it trusted, lets you exclude that location from the tenant-wide MFA policy while still meeting the broader requirement to enforce MFA for everyone else and for on-prem apps published via Azure AD Application Proxy. In short: define Boston’s public IP as a named location and use it in your Conditional Access policy exclusion to satisfy the exemption precisely and securely.

In Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD), the per-user device cap is controlled in Devices > Device settings. The SC-300 materials describe that administrators can configure “Users may join devices to Azure AD” and the “Maximum number of devices per user”. The guide notes that this limit defaults to five and is used to “control how many devices a user can join or register in Azure AD”; when users reach the limit, “they cannot add additional devices until the limit is increased or an existing device is removed.” For scenarios like field or sales staff who use multiple devices, the study content recommends adjusting this value to meet business needs. Because A. Datum’s sales users hit the current cap and a requirement states “Increase the maximum number of devices that can be joined or registered to Azure AD to 10,” the fix is to change the tenant’s Device settings—not User settings, Access reviews, or Security defaults. This aligns with the exam objective to configure device settings for Azure AD join and registration and addresses the precise symptom reported by users.

Answer is

This question asks you to apply the stated Technical Requirements for Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) to complete the form. The specific scenario about "User3" is a distraction, as the configuration applies to all users.

The relevant technical requirements are:

"Users must provide one authentication method to reset their password by using SSPR."

This directly dictates the value for the Number of authentication methods required, which is 1.

"Available methods must include: Email, Phone, Security questions, The Microsoft Authenticator app"

This lists all the options that are configured to be available for SSPR, which determines the value for Authentication methods that can be used: Email,Phone,Security questions,The Microsoft Authenticator app.

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator official study guide and the Microsoft Learn “Implement and manage Azure AD Identity Protection” module, Azure AD Identity Protection detects two primary categories of risks: user risks and sign-in risks.

User Risk Policy:A user risk represents the probability that a user's identity (credentials) has been compromised. Examples of user risk signals include leaked credentials, unusual sign-ins from different geographies, or sign-ins from infected devices. The Exam Ref SC-300 specifically lists “leaked credentials detected on the dark web or other compromised repositories” as the main trigger for a user risk policy. Such a policy can automatically force password change or enforce MFA to remediate the threat.

Sign-in Risk Policy:A sign-in risk reflects the likelihood that a specific authentication attempt is not performed by the legitimate user. Sign-in risk is based on context, such as sign-ins from suspicious browsers, anonymous IP addresses (like TOR networks), or impossible travel scenarios. The SC-300 documentation highlights these examples as conditions best handled with a sign-in risk policy, where conditional access can block or require MFA for the risky sign-in attempt.

Therefore:

Leaked credentials are addressed through a User Risk Policy, since the account itself is compromised.

Sign-ins from suspicious browsers and access from anonymous IP addresses are handled through Sign-in Risk Policies, as they relate to risky sessions rather than compromised identities.

For Identity Governance (Entitlement Management), the materials clarify who can create and manage access reviews of access packages: “To create or manage access reviews for access packages, you must be a Global administrator, an Identity Governance administrator, a catalog owner for the catalog that contains the access package, or an access package manager.” The exam text also states: “User administrator does not grant the ability to manage entitlement management access reviews unless the user is delegated as a catalog owner or access package manager.” Given the scenario’s user roles, User3 (Identity Governance administrator) and User5 (Global administrator) satisfy these permissions and therefore can create and manage the access review for Package1. By contrast, User4 (User administrator) cannot perform this task by role alone. This selection follows the least-privilege guidance emphasized in SC-300: use specialized governance roles (Identity Governance admin or delegated catalog roles) rather than broad directory roles when possible.

Azure AD External collaboration settings govern who can bring guests into the tenant. The SC-300 content specifies: “External collaboration settings let you control who can invite guests (Anyone, Members, Guests, or Only admins and users in the Guest Inviter role) and whether guests can invite.” It also highlights: “To restrict guest invitations to administrators or designated inviters, configure External collaboration to ‘Only admins and users in the Guest Inviter role’ and disable guest-to-guest invitations if required.” Because the problem states that “Anyone in the organization can invite guest users, including other guests and non-administrators,” the remediation is to tighten External collaboration settings so only approved roles (e.g., Global admins, Guest Inviter, or specific administrators) can invite. Access reviews address periodic entitlement verification, Conditional Access enforces sign-in/session policies, and Continuous Access Evaluation relates to token lifetime/signal-based revocation; none of these change who can send guest invitations. Adjusting External collaboration settings directly resolves the issue and aligns with the requirement that “only users that are assigned specific admin roles can invite guest users.”

Comprehensive and Detailed In-Depth Explanation:

Let’s break this down step by step based on Microsoft Entra Internet Access, Global Secure Access, and the requirements for routing internet traffic from on-premises devices, as outlined in Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator documentation.

Understanding the Scenario and Requirements:

On-premises devices running Windows or Linux:The devices are located in an on-premises environment (e.g., a corporate office or branch) and run either Windows or Linux operating systems.

Microsoft 365 E5 subscription:This subscription includes Microsoft Entra ID P2 and Microsoft Entra Internet Access, which are part of the Global Secure Access suite. This provides the necessary licensing for the solution.

Microsoft Entra Internet Access:This is a Secure Web Gateway (SWG) solution that securesinternet and SaaS app access by routing traffic through Microsoft’s Security Service Edge (SSE) for policy evaluation (e.g., web content filtering, Conditional Access).

Requirement:All on-premises devices must route their internet traffic through Global Secure Access for security policy evaluation. Global Secure Access is the unified framework for Microsoft Entra Internet Access and Microsoft Entra Private Access, providing a centralized way to manage network traffic security.

How Global Secure Access Routes Internet Traffic:

Global Secure Access can route internet traffic in two primary ways:

Global Secure Access Client:This client is installed on individual devices (e.g., Windows, macOS, Android, iOS) and routes traffic from the device to Microsoft’s SSE for policy evaluation. The client is user-aware and integrates with Microsoft Entra ID for identity-based policies.

Remote Network:This method creates an IPsec tunnel between an on-premises network (e.g., a branch office) and Microsoft’s SSE. All internet-bound traffic from devices in the network is routed through the tunnel for security policy evaluation, without requiring a client on each device.

The question involvesmultiple on-premises devicesrunning Windows or Linux, which suggests a network-level solution may be more practical than installing a client on each device, especially since Linux support for the Global Secure Access client is limited.

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and Microsoft Learn’s official training on “Manage entitlement management in Azure AD Identity Governance”, connected organizations and access package policies determine who can request access packages.

When creating an access package for external users, administrators define connected organizations and then specify who from those organizations is allowed to request access. This configuration is managed through access package policies within Identity Governance. Each policy defines the requestors (users from specific domains or organizations) and approval settings.

To allow access for users who have @fabrikam.com email addresses, the correct step is to configure an access package policy in Identity Governance, specifying that only users whose domain matches fabrikam.com can request access.

However, since Fabrikam also owns another domain (litwareinc.com), and you want to block those users from accessing the package, this restriction cannot be configured solely through the access package policy. The Microsoft documentation clarifies that to block specific external domains from collaborating or being invited into the tenant, administrators must use the External collaboration settings in Azure AD. These settings allow tenant administrators to define which external domains are allowed or denied for guest invitations.

Thus:

To allow fabrikam.com → configure Access package policy in Identity Governance (to specify who can request the package).

To block litwareinc.com → configure External collaboration settings in Azure AD (to block invitations or collaboration from that domain).

According to the Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator (SC-300) Official Study Guide and Microsoft Entra documentation, role assignments in Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) can be scoped at directory (tenant-wide) or administrative unit (AU) levels.

An Administrative Unit (AU) is a logical grouping of Azure AD resources (users, groups, devices) that allows administrators to delegate management responsibilities. When you assign roles scoped to an AU, the permissions of the role apply only to objects within that AU.

From Microsoft’s “Manage role-based access control (RBAC) with administrative units” module:

“You can assign directory roles to users either at the tenant level or scoped to an administrative unit. Only users who are members of the AU can be assigned roles scoped to that AU.”

Applying this to the scenario:

User1 is a member of AU1. Therefore, User1 is eligible for a role assignment scoped to AU1 and/or tenant-wide (contoso.com). User1 can have the Security Administrator role assigned at both AU1 and contoso.com.

User2 is not a member of AU1. Users who are not members of an administrative unit cannot be assigned roles scoped to that AU. Thus, User2’s User Administrator role can be assigned only at the tenant-wide (contoso.com) level.

This aligns with the Microsoft Learn reference:

“Only members of an administrative unit can be assigned directory roles scoped to that administrative unit. Roles can always be assigned at the organization level regardless of AU membership.”

Privileged Identity Management (PIM) for groups in Microsoft Entra ID can only be applied to eligible assignment groups, specifically security groups and Microsoft 365 groups that have a membership type of Assigned. According to Microsoft documentation (“Manage Privileged Access Groups in PIM”), only assigned groups can be enabled for PIM. Dynamic groups are not supported for PIM because their memberships are automatically managed based on rules, and PIM requires manual activation and approval for eligible roles or memberships.

From the official study guide and Microsoft Learn module “Implement Privileged Identity Management (PIM) for Groups”:

“Only groups with an Assigned membership type can be managed in Privileged Identity Management. Dynamic membership groups cannot be enabled for privileged access.”

Therefore, among the listed groups:

Group1 (Security, Assigned) → Supported

Group2 (Security, Dynamic) → Not supported

Group3 (Microsoft 365, Assigned) → Supported

Group4 (Microsoft 365, Dynamic) → Not supported

✅ Correct Answer: C. Group1 and Group3 only

Statement

Answer

1. Before Admin1 can perform a task that requires the User Administrator role, an approver must approve the activation request.

Yes

2. Admin2 can request activation of the User Administrator role for a period of two hours.

No

3. If Admin3 connects to the Azure Active Directory admin center, and then activates the User Administrator role, Admin3 will be prompted to authenticate by using multi-factor authentication (MFA) twice.

Based on Microsoft’s SC-300 Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide, Microsoft Learn module “Manage Azure AD roles by using Privileged Identity Management (PIM)”, and Exam Ref SC-300, the following logic applies:

Approval requirement (Admin1) — In the Role setting details image, Require approval to activate is set to Yes, and one approver is listed. This means before any user (e.g., Admin1) can activate the User Administrator role, approval must be granted. Therefore, Admin1 must have the activation request approved before performing any User Administrator tasks. ✅ (Yes)

Activation duration (Admin2) — The configuration shows Activation maximum duration (hours): 8 hours. This defines the maximum allowed time a user can remain active after role activation. Admin2 can activate for up to 8 hours, not 2 hours unless specifically limited during activation. Hence, the statement claiming Admin2 can activate for “two hours” is incorrect. ❌ (No)

MFA enforcement (Admin3) — Two relevant controls exist:

Conditional Access policy requiring MFA for all users.

PIM role setting On activation, require Azure MFA = Yes.

According to Microsoft documentation, when both Conditional Access and PIM MFA enforcement apply, Azure AD intelligently avoids redundant prompts by honoring a single valid MFA session token. This means Admin3 would only be prompted once for MFA, even though both mechanisms require it. ❌ (No)

Therefore, as verified by official Microsoft materials and SC-300 documentation:

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and Microsoft Learn content under “Manage Azure AD tenants and configure tenant properties”, self-service sign-up (also known as viral sign-up) allows users to create accounts in an existing Azure AD tenant using an email domain associated with that tenant. This feature lets external or ungoverned users create identities if it is not explicitly disabled, which can cause unauthorized account creation in the organization’s namespace.

To stop users from performing self-service sign-ups using the organization’s verified domain (e.g., contoso.com), administrators must disable the AllowEmailVerifiedUsers setting in Azure Active Directory using PowerShell. This configuration change prevents users from automatically creating accounts with the organization’s domain when registering for Microsoft 365 or other Azure services.

The cmdlet used to configure tenant-level settings like this is Set-MsolCompanySettings from the MSOnline module.

The specific PowerShell command would be:

Set-MsolCompanySettings -AllowEmailVerifiedUsers $false

This command disables self-service sign-up for email-verified users, ensuring that only administrators can create accounts in the tenant.

Other cmdlets in the options serve different purposes:

Set-MsolDomainFederationSettings – Used for configuring federation settings for a domain.

Update-MsolFederatedDomain – Used to update or repair federation trust settings.

Set-MsolDomain – Used to configure domain-specific properties (e.g., authentication type).

As per Microsoft’s official documentation:

“To prevent users from self-service sign-up using your organization’s verified domain, set AllowEmailVerifiedUsers to $false using Set-MsolCompanySettings.”

In Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD), Security Defaults is a built-in baseline security configuration that enforces basic identity protection, such as requiring all users to register for multi-factor authentication (MFA) using the Microsoft Authenticator app. When security defaults are enabled, users cannot select alternate MFA methods (like SMS or phone call).

According to the Microsoft SC-300 Official Study Guide and Azure AD Identity Protection documentation, only administrators with elevated security roles—specifically the Security Administrator, Global Administrator, or Conditional Access Administrator—can enable or disable security defaults.

Here’s the detailed reasoning:

User1 (Security Administrator): This role can manage identity security settings, including modifying MFA configurations and security defaults.

User2 (Privileged Authentication Administrator): This role can reset MFA details for other users but cannot modify tenant-wide MFA or security default settings.

User3 (Service Support Administrator): This role is limited to viewing service health and support tickets and has no permissions to modify security configurations.

Since User2 is restricted by security defaults (which enforce Microsoft Authenticator only), the only way to allow alternative MFA methods is to disable or customize security defaults. That configuration must be done by User1 (Security Administrator).

Microsoft Documentation: “To enable or disable security defaults, you must be a Global Administrator, Security Administrator, or Conditional Access Administrator.”

When users accept or decline a Terms of Use (ToU) in Azure AD, these actions are recorded in the audit logs. The Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator documentation specifies that audit logs capture “Terms of use acceptance records” including who accepted, who declined, timestamp, and version of the ToU accepted.

The other options are incorrect because:

Provisioning logs capture provisioning events (not ToU).

Usage and Insights reports provide activity metrics, not compliance actions.

Sign-in logs capture authentication activity but not ToU acceptance.

Therefore, to identify which users accepted or declined Terms1, you should use the Audit logs in Azure AD.

 User1 can use self-service password reset (SSPR) to reset his password: Yes

 If User1 accesses Microsoft Exchange Online, he will be authenticated by an on-premises domain controller: Yes

 User2 can be added to a Microsoft SharePoint Online site as a member: No

Based on Microsoft’s SC-300 Study Guide, Exam Ref SC-300: Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator, and Azure AD documentation, Azure AD Connect synchronization is governed by OU filtering, authentication method, and synchronization scope.

In this configuration, Azure AD Connect is set to “Sync selected domains and OUs,” and only OU1 is selected. Therefore, only objects (users, groups, etc.) located in OU1 are synchronized to Azure AD.

User1 (in OU1) is synchronized to Azure AD. Since password writeback is enabled (as seen in the configuration “Enable password writeback”), User1 can perform Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) from Azure AD, and the change will write back to on-premises AD.Hence, the first statement is Yes.

Pass-through authentication is also enabled in the configuration (“Enable Pass-through authentication”). With PTA, when User1 accesses Microsoft 365 services (like Exchange Online), the authentication request is forwarded from Azure AD to an on-premises domain controller via the PTA agent. Therefore, authentication is handled by the local AD DS.Hence, the second statement is Yes.

User2 (in OU2) is not synchronized, as OU2 was not selected in the Domain/OU filtering configuration. This means User2 does not exist in Azure AD and cannot be granted access to Microsoft 365 resources, including SharePoint Online.Hence, the third statement is No.

This logic aligns with Microsoft documentation under “Configure filtering for Azure AD Connect,” which states:

“Only objects from selected domains and organizational units are synchronized. Users outside selected OUs are excluded from Azure AD and cannot authenticate or access cloud resources.”

In the SC-300 materials on Microsoft Entra PIM for Azure resources and Azure Key Vault authorization, you’re guided to use Azure RBAC (data-plane roles)—not legacy access policies—when you need time-bound, approvable, least-privilege access managed through PIM. The guide explains that PIM can make users Eligible or Active for Azure resource roles and that Key Vault provides specific data actions via built-in RBAC roles. For secrets, the roles are scoped to a vault (and can be further restricted by resource scope) and are purpose-built:

Key Vault Secrets Officer — described as allowing a user to “create, read, update, and delete secrets” without granting key or certificate permissions. This precisely satisfies User1’s requirement to read and update Secret1 while keeping scope limited to secrets (least privilege compared to broader Owner/Contributor).

Key Vault Secrets User — documented to “read secret contents” only. This matches User2’s requirement to read the contents of the secrets stored in Vault2 while preventing modification or management actions.

The SC-300 coverage stresses that RBAC roles for Key Vault separate permissions for keys, secrets, and certificates, enabling least privilege and PIM governance (eligible/activation, approvals, MFA, and just-in-time) for access to sensitive data.

When enabling Microsoft Entra (Azure AD) login for a virtual machine, you must assign a managed identity so that the VM can authenticate to Azure AD and access other Azure resources securely without storing credentials.

Between the two types of managed identities—system-assigned and user-assigned—the system-assigned identity is the most appropriate when the identity is unique to the VM and should be automatically managed by Azure.

Once you enable a system-assigned managed identity, Azure creates an identity tied directly to the VM’s lifecycle. It allows the VM to request tokens from Microsoft Entra ID and access resources within Sub1 under the permissions granted through RBAC.

From Microsoft documentation:

“To enable Microsoft Entra login for your VM, the VM must have a system-assigned managed identity that is granted access to Azure resources.”

To answer this question correctly, we must reference the supported cloud platforms for Microsoft Entra Permissions Management (formerly known as CloudKnox).

1. What is Microsoft Entra Permissions Management? Microsoft Entra Permissions Management is a Cloud Infrastructure Entitlement Management (CIEM) solution. Its primary purpose is to discover, remediate, and monitor permission risks for any identity and any resource across your multi-cloud infrastructure.

2. Supported Cloud Platforms: According to the official Microsoft Entra Permissions Management documentation, the service provides comprehensive visibility and control over permissions for the following specific cloud providers:

Microsoft Azure

Amazon Web Services (AWS)

Google Cloud Platform (GCP)

3. Analysis of the Options:

Alibaba Cloud: While Microsoft Defender for Cloud (CSPM) and Azure AD (for SSO) have integrations with Alibaba Cloud, Microsoft Entra Permissions Management explicitly supports only the three major public clouds listed above (Azure, AWS, and GCP). It does not currently support Alibaba Cloud for entitlement and permission management.

The Scenario: You have already configured it for Azure. You need to identify which additional platforms from the list (Alibaba, AWS, GCP) can be managed.

Conclusion: Since Alibaba Cloud is not supported, the only remaining valid platforms from your list are AWS and GCP.

Reference Extract:

"Microsoft Entra Permissions Management is a cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) solution that provides comprehensive visibility into permissions assigned to all identities... across cloud infrastructures Microsoft Azure, Amazon Web Services (AWS), and Google Cloud Platform (GCP)."