ECCouncil 112-57 Dumps

The scenario describes the investigator collectingvolatileartifacts—specifically information inRAM, activeDLLs, system and network state, and transient data held incacheand similar runtime locations—through the device’s normal interface while the system is running. In digital forensics documentation, this is the defining characteristic oflive acquisition(also called live response). Live acquisition is performed when the system remains powered on so that investigators can capture evidence that would be lost on shutdown, such as running processes, open network connections, logged-on sessions, loaded modules/DLLs, encryption keys, and portions of registry data that exist in memory or are actively changing.

By contrast,static acquisitionanddead acquisitionare conducted when the system is powered off (or the evidence drive is imaged outside the running OS), focusing primarily on persistent storage such as disk sectors and file system structures.Non-volatile data acquisitionrefers to collecting persistent data stored on media (e.g., files on disk), which does not match the emphasis on RAM and other volatile components in the question. Because the investigator is explicitly collecting volatile data from a running system via its normal interface, the correct method isLive acquisition (B).

In digital forensics, acquisition formats differ mainly in how they store evidence data, metadata, and whether they support features like compression, segmentation, and integrity verification. ARaw formatis a sector-by-sector bitstream image (often called “dd” style) and typically doesnotdefine built-in compression or structured metadata; any compression would be external to the format. “Proprietary format” is not a single defined standard—some proprietary images may compress data, but the option is too generic and not tied to a specific, documented compression method.

The format known in forensic documentation for explicitly supporting modern compression such asLZMAisAFF4 (Advanced Forensic Format 4), which is designed as a next-generation container supporting rich metadata, hashing, chunked storage, and pluggable compression options. AFF4’s architecture stores evidence in compressed chunks/streams and commonly associates LZMA with efficient, high-ratio compression while preserving forensic requirements such as repeatable verification through cryptographic hashes.

The option “Advanced ForensicFramework 4” corresponds toAFF4in many exam question banks and training materials. Therefore, the correct choice isC, because AFF4 is the acquisition format recognized for supportingLZMA compressionas part of its standardized capabilities.

In Windows forensics, the Registry is organized into logical root keys (“hives”) that aggregate configuration and security data. The items named in the question—SAM,SECURITY, andSOFTWARE—aresystem-wide registry hivesstored on disk (typically under the system’s configuration directory) and loaded at runtime underHKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE (HKLM). Investigators rely on these hives because they contain high-value evidence: theSAMhive stores local account database information (including user and group identifiers and credential-related material), theSECURITYhive holds system security policy and LSA-related settings, and theSOFTWAREhive contains installed software, application configuration, and many operating system settings relevant for program execution and persistence analysis.

Tools likeFTK Imagercan extract these hives (or their live-memory representations) during triage to preserve volatile context and enable offline parsing while maintaining evidentiary integrity. The other root keys do not match these specific hives:HKEY_CURRENT_USERis per-user profile data,HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIGreflects current hardware profile, andHKEY_CLASSES_ROOTis primarily file association/COM class mapping (largely derived from HKLM\Software\Classes and HKCU\Software\Classes). Therefore, the correct hive root that provides SAM, SECURITY, and SOFTWARE subkeys isHKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE (B).