The SecOps Group CNSP Dumps

In Linux/Unix, theSUID (Set User ID)bit allows a program to execute with the owner’s permissions, typically root, rather than the caller’s. It’s denoted by an s in the user execute field (e.g., -rwsr-xr-x). Common SUID programs perform privileged tasks requiring temporary elevation.

Analysis:

C. /usr/bin/passwd:

Purpose: Updates user passwords in /etc/shadow (root-owned, 0600 perms).

Permissions: Typically -rwsr-xr-x, owned by root. The SUID bit lets non-root users modify shadow securely.

Command: ls -l /usr/bin/passwd confirms SUID (s in user execute).

A. /bin/ls:

Purpose: Lists directory contents, no privileged access needed.

Permissions: -rwxr-xr-x (no SUID).Runs as the calling user.

B. /usr/bin/curl:

Purpose: Transfers data over HTTP/FTP, no root privileges required by default.

Permissions: -rwxr-xr-x (no SUID).

Technical Details:

SUID Bit: Set via chmod u+s or chmod 4755.

Security: SUID binaries are audited (e.g., find / -perm -u=s) due to escalation risks if writable or poorly coded (e.g., buffer overflows).

Security Implications:CNSP likely highlights SUID as an attack vector (e.g., CVE-1996-0095 exploited passwd flaws). Hardening removes unnecessary SUID bits.

Why other options are incorrect:

A, B:Lack SUID; no privileged operations.

D:Incorrect, as /usr/bin/passwd is a SUID example.

Real-World Context:SUID on /bin/su or /usr/bin/sudo similarly enables privilege escalation, often targeted in exploits.References:CNSP Official Documentation (Linux Security); Linux File Permissions Guide.

The Windows Registry is a hierarchical database storing configuration settings for the operating system, applications, and hardware. It’s physically stored ashive fileson disk, located in the directoryC:\Windows\System32\Config. These files are loaded into memory at boot time and managed by the Windows kernel. Key hive files include:

SYSTEM:Contains hardware and system configuration (e.g., drivers, services).

SOFTWARE:Stores software settings.

SAM:Security Accounts Manager data (e.g., local user accounts, passwords).

SECURITY:Security policies and permissions.

DEFAULT:Default user profile settings.

USERDIFFand user-specific hives (e.g., NTUSER.DAT in C:\Users) for individual profiles, though these are linked to Config indirectly.

Technical Details:

Path:C:\Windows\System32\Configis the primary location for system-wide hives. Files lack extensions (e.g., "SYSTEM" not "SYSTEM.DAT") and are backed by transaction logs (e.g., SYSTEM.LOG) for recovery.

Access: Direct file access is restricted while Windows runs, as the kernel locks them. Tools like reg save or offline forensic utilities (e.g., RegRipper) can extract them.

Backup: Copies may exist in C:\Windows\System32\config\RegBack (pre-Windows 10 1803) or repair folders (e.g., C:\Windows\Repair).

Security Implications:The registry is a prime target for attackers (e.g., persistence via Run keys) and malware (e.g., WannaCry modified registry entries). CNSP likely emphasizes securing this directory (e.g., NTFS permissions) and auditing changes (e.g., via Event Viewer, Event ID 4657). Compromising these files offline (e.g., via physical access) can extract password hashes from SAM.

Why other options are incorrect:

A. C:\Windows\debug:Used for debug logs (e.g., memory.dmp) or tools like DebugView, not registry hives. It’s unrelated to core configuration storage.

C. C:\Windows\security:Contains security-related files (e.g., audit logs, policy templates), but not the registry hives themselves.

D. All of the above:Only B is correct; including A and C dilutes accuracy.

Real-World Context:Forensic analysts target C:\Windows\System32\Config during investigations (e.g., parsing SAM with Mimikatz offline).References:CNSP Official Study Guide (Windows Security Architecture); Microsoft Windows Registry Documentation.

EternalBlue(MS17-010) is an exploit targeting a buffer overflow in Microsoft’s SMB (Server Message Block) implementation, leaked by the Shadow Brokers in 2017. SMB enables file/printer sharing:

SMBv1 (1980s):Legacy, used in Windows NT/XP.

SMBv2 (2006, Vista):Enhanced performance/security.

SMBv3 (2012, Windows 8):Adds encryption, multichannel.

Vulnerability:

EternalBlue exploits a flaw inSMBv1’s SRVNET driver (srv.sys), allowing remote code execution via crafted packets. Microsoft patched it in March 2017 (MS17-010).

Affected OS: Windows XP to Server 2016 (pre-patch), if SMBv1 enabled.

Proof: WannaCry/NotPetya used it, targeting port 445/TCP.

Version Scope:

SMBv1 Only:The bug resides in SMBv1’s packet handling (e.g., TRANS2 requests). SMBv2/v3 rewrote this code, immune to the specific overflow.

Microsoft: Post-patch, SMBv1 is disabled by default (Windows 10 1709+).

Security Implications:CNSP likely stresses disabling SMBv1 (e.g., via Group Policy) and patching, as EternalBlue remains a threat in legacy environments.

Why other options are incorrect:

B, C:SMBv2/v3 aren’t vulnerable; the flaw is SMBv1-specific.

D:SMBv2 isn’t affected, only SMBv1.

Real-World Context:WannaCry’s 2017 rampage hit unpatched SMBv1 systems (e.g., NHS), costing billions.References:CNSP Official Documentation (Windows Exploits); Microsoft MS17-010 Bulletin.